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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the role of mobile phones in governance for doing business in Sub-
Saharan Africa with data from the period 2000-2012 by employing the Generalised Method of 
Moments.  Three broad concepts of governance are explored, namely: (i) political 
(comprising voice & accountability and political stability/no violence), (ii) economic 
(involving government effectiveness and regulation quality) and (iii) institutional (including 
corruption-control and rule of law). Ten dimensions of entrepreneurship are considered. Two 
main findings are established with respect to the net effects of the interaction between mobile 
phones and governance dynamics. They are (1) reduced cost of business start-up procedure, 
the time to build a warehouse and the time to resolve an insolvency; (2) increased start-up 
procedure to register a business; the time to enforce a contract; the time to register a property 
and time to prepare and pay taxes.  Implications for theory and policy are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
At least three reasons motivate an inquiry into the role of mobile phones
1
 in 
institutional quality for entrepreneurship in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
 2
.   
 First, there is a high potential for information and communication technology (ICT) 
penetration in Africa given that high-end markets in Asia, Europe and North America are 
experiencing stabilization in the growth of ICTs like mobile phones (see Penard et al., 2012; 
Asongu, 2015). Hence, policy reforms could be leveraged on the mobile phone penetration 
potential to address economic concerns like job creation in the African continent. 
 Second, entrepreneurship for job creation has been documented as one of the principal 
remedies for Africa’s growing population and corresponding unemployment (Tchamyou, 
2016). In essence, the current  generation is witnessing the most significant demographic 
transformation  and Africa is playing a substantial role in the transition. To be sure, the  
continent’s population has been projected to  double by 2036;  representing about twenty 
percent of the world (UN, 2009; Asongu, 2013). Unemployment, especially among the youth, 
has been documented as one of the most important challenges of this demographic transition 
(Brixiova et al., 2015; AERC, 2014). According to the narrative, the continent has been 
endowed with the fastest growing youth demography, which represents about 20 percent of its 
population. The percentage of population between the age of 15 and 24 may represent sub-
optimal and negative externalities if jobs are not available to accommodate this anticipated 
demographic shift. Such increase in youth unemployment has been clearly articulated as the 
most challenging consequence with a multitude of negative externalities, inter alia: criminal 
activities and engagement in armed conflicts. 
 Third, in the light of the above policy concerns, the literature has failed to address 
linkages between ICT and entrepreneurship in Africa. The study closest to this relationship is 
Tchamyou (2016) which investigated the role of the knowledge economy in African business. 
It concluded that the four dimensions of the World Bank’s knowledge economy index played 
a fundamental role in driving the starting and the continuation of  business in Africa. We 
extend this literature by assessing the role of governance in mobile phones for 
entrepreneurship. Whereas governance is the main independent variable, mobile phone 
                                                          
1
 Throughout this study, the terms ‘mobile’, ‘mobile telephony’, ‘mobile phones’ and ‘mobile phone penetration’ 
are used interchangeably.   
2
 Consistent with Naudé (2010) and Brixiova et al. (2015), entrepreneurship is defined in this study as the 
process and resources whereby individuals can use market avenues to create new enterprises. 
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penetration is considered as a policy variable. The motivation to include governance 
indicators builds on a stream of recent literature on the relevance of good governance in 
addressing sustainable development challenges such as unemployment in Africa. In essence, 
the quality of government has been increasingly linked with higher standards of living, 
especially in terms of improving: the quality of life and the efficient allocation of resources 
(Fosu, 2013; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014), the situation of the deprived elderly 
(Fonchingong, 2014) and the basis of changes in society (Fosu, 2015a, 2015b; Efobi, 2015).  
 In addition to the above justification for harnessing good governance and mobile 
phones for entrepreneurship in SSA, there has been caution in scholarly circles not to consider 
the mobile phone as a silver bullet of development (Mpogole et al., 2008, p. 71).  To enhance 
opportunities for policy implications, three main governance categories are employed, 
namely: (i) political governance (involving political stability/no violence and voice & 
accountability); (ii) economic governance (covering government effectiveness and regulation 
quality) and (iii) institutional governance (comprising corruption-control and the rule of law). 
“Political governance is defined as the election and replacement of political leaders. 
Economic governance is the formulation and implementation of rules that enable the delivery 
of public goods and services. Institutional governance is the respect of the state and citizens 
for  institutions that govern interactions between them” (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a, p. 2)  
The remainder of the paper is presented as follows. The theoretical underpinnings and 
related literature are dicussed in Section 2. The data and methodology are covered in Section 
3. Section 4 presents the empirical results and corresponding discussion while Section 5 
concludes with future research directions.  
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings and related literature  
 The relevance of knowledge and ICT in economic prosperity has been the subject of 
much scholarly concern (Asongu et al., 2016).  The literature is consistent with a two-way 
causality flow between economic development and knowledge.  Compared to the neoclassical 
growth theories of economic development which acknowledged technology and know-how as 
public goods and services which are strictly exogenous to the economic system, both neo-
Schumpeterian and endogenous interpretations of economic development are the basis for 
new economic development (Howells, 2005). According to the underlying growth 
underpinnings, progress in technology is the result of an immediate investment by citizens via 
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critical resource mobilizations which are essentially related to human resources (Romer, 
1990).  
 Theories of new growth have defined technology within the framework of private 
commodities. Furthermore, knowledge generation that is linked with the creation of novel 
intellectual property and other forms of benefits for technology can be                                                              
acknowledged as private commodities (Solow, 1994).  Whereas private characteristics of 
technology (such as monopolistic power, trademarks and patents) have been established in 
some models of economic prosperity, some scholarly positions maintain that for the most part, 
rents result from monopolies that are temporary (Uzawa, 1965).   In accordance with Romer 
(1990), technological progress can be at the same time endogenous and exogenous in the 
perspective that with the unfolding of time, technological features enable the technology to 
adopt the characteristics of a public commodity.  The author further argues that because of 
cross-country technological spillovers, rewards from technology by nations are quite 
heterogeneous.  Therefore, development in technology could result in disequilibrium in 
human and economic development processes. Such explains cross-country disparities in 
economic development (see Verspagen, 1997). According to Rosenberg (1972), the 
employment of new technologies for productive avenues is critical in clarifying economic 
prosperity. This implies that technological output can be leveraged for entrepreneurial 
purposes.  
 As recently documented by Brixiova et al. (2015), the relevance of productive 
entrepreneurship for economic development as well as variations in the types of 
entrepreneurship across nations have already been substantially studied (also see Baumol, 
1968, 1990). According to the authors, both empirical and theoretical literature on factors 
affecting entrepreneurship in developing countries in general and Africa in particular are 
comparatively scarce. Some papers in this strand include: Baumol (2010); Naudé (2008, 
2010); Leff (1979); Brixiova (2010, 2013) and Gelb et al. (2009).  
 The policy concern for youth unemployment in Africa has already been discussed in 
the introduction. Entrepreneurship is a means by which this policy syndrome could be 
addressed. The following principal causes of youth unemployment has been documented in 
the literature, inter alia: changes in population settings (Korenman & Neumark, 2000); 
development of human resources (O’Higgins, 2001); social capital (like networks and family 
background) (Coleman, 1988); mismatches in geography and skills (2003) and idiosyncratic 
specificities and structural variations of economies (Peterson & Vroman, 1992). 
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  Alagidede (2008) has established that entrepreneurship in Africa may be too risky. 
Eifert et al. (2008) investigated the cost of doing business on the continent to conclude that 
existing estimates undervalue the comparative performance of African corporations. A legal 
view of changes in and challenges of doing business in South Africa is provided by Taplin 
and Synman (2004). The intensity by which trade influences business cycle synchronization is 
assessed by Tapsoba (2010) who has concluded on evidence of some causal effect.  The 
establishment and progress of entrepreneurs in East Africa has been investigated by Khavul et 
al. (2009) who concluded that substantial community and family ties are employed by 
entrepreneurs to grow their businesses. The role of foreign direct investment in social 
responsibility was assessed by Bardy et al. (2012) in developing countries to provide 
interesting practical and theoretical insights into the relationship. Paul et al. (2010) examined 
the influence of labour regulation externalities on the cost of doing business to establish that 
the indicators of doing business from the World Bank do not provide a complete perspective 
on the employment of workers.  
The intension to become an entrepreneur by Ethiopian undergraduate students  was  
considered by Gerba (2012) to conclude that their desire to become entrepreneurs increased 
with lessons and studies on the doing of business.  Singh et al. (2011) investigated the drivers 
behind the decision to become entrepreneurs by Nigerian women to find the following 
motivations: family capital; internal and education environments which are characterised by 
economic deregulation and social recognition that is internally-oriented.  
 The relationship between youth entrepreneurship and  financial literacy  was examined 
by Oseifuah (2010) in South Africa to establish that financial literacy is a critical determinant 
of entrepreneurial skills. Mensah and Benedict (2010)  studied the long-run consequences of 
entrepreneurship training to conclude that poverty-reducing hand-outs from the government 
only lead to short-run impacts, with ambiguous externalities on violent protests and 
demonstrations. Conversely, the availability of training and opportunities for entrepreneurship 
provide small enterprises with avenues for  improving their businesses which eventually 
mitigate poverty. The above narratives are broadly in line with policy reports on the 
challenges to entrepreneurship in Africa (see Leke et al., 2010; Ernst & Young, 2013).  
In more contemporary African entrepreneurship literature, Tchamyou (2016) has 
investigated the role of the knowledge economy in doing business, whereas Asongu and 
Tchamyou (2016)  evaluated the influence of entrepreneurship in the knowledge economy. An 
interesting finding from the two studies is that causality flows in  both directions, notably 
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from the knowledge economy to entrepreneurship and from entrepreneurship to knowledge 
economy. As emphasised in the introduction, the present inquiry builds on the underlying 
literature to assess the role of mobile phones in governance for entrepreneurship in SSA. 
In the light of the above, the principal contribution of this paper is to complement the 
existing macroeconomic literature on how entrepreneurship can be boosted in less developed 
countries. By contributing to the macroeconomic literature on managing technology for 
entrepreneurship, the positioning of the study substantially deviates from the microeconomic 
literature on employing technology in entrepreneurial opportunities. Contemporary literature 
within this strand has included: emphasis on a series of innovations in entrepreneurship which 
are continuously improving because of financial resources and novel skills (Best, 2015); 
opportunity discovery and opportunity creation within the perspective of disruptive 
innovation (Wan et al., 2015; Hang et al., 2015); opportunities of entrepreneurship from an 
ageing population (Kohlbacher et al., 2015) and evolving ecosystems (Overholm,  2015); 
identification of opportunities by research collaborators (McKelveyet al., 2015) and scientific 
entrepreneurs (Maine et al., 2015) and technological advancements offering new opportunities 
owing to the road-mapping of patents (Jeong & Yoon, 2015). This  investigation also 
complements a stream of technology management literature on the consequences of emerging 
technologies,  particularly: on the relevance  of mobile phones in social change and 
development (Cozzens, 2011; Mira & Dangersfield, 2012; Brouwer & Brito,  2012; Islama & 
Meadeb, 2012; Thakar, 2012; Alkemade  & Surrs, 2012; Gupta & Jain, 2012; Sonne, 2012; 
Amankwah-Amoah, 2015, 2016; Amankwah-Amoah & Sarpong, 2016).  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 The study investigates a panel of 49 countries in SSA with data from World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and World Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank 
for the period 2000-2012. The adopted periodicity is based on data availability constraints 
whereas the scope of SSA is in line with the motivation of the study. Consistent with recent 
entrepreneurship literature (Tchamyou, 2016; Asongu & Tchamyou, 2016), ten dependent 
variables on entrepreneurship are used, namely: (i) cost of business start-up procedure; (ii) 
procedure to enforce a contract; (iii) start-up procedures to register a business; (iv) time 
required to build a warehouse; (v) time required to enforce a contract; (vi) time required to 
register a property; (vii) time required to start a business; (viii) time to export; (ix) time to 
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prepare and pay taxes and (x) time to resolve an insolvency. A decreasing tendency in these 
variables implies a positive condition for entrepreneurship.  
 Six governance variables from three main categories are employed, namely: (i) 
political governance (involving political stability/no violence and voice & accountability); (ii) 
economic governance (covering government effectiveness and regulation quality) and (iii) 
institutional governance (comprising corruption-control and the rule of law). These 
governance indicators which were abstracted from Kaufmann et al. (2010) have been 
employed in recent institutional literature (see Gani, 2011; Yerrabit & Hawkes, 2015; Andrés 
et al., 2015; Oluwatobi et al., 2015). The mobile phone penetration rate (per 100 people) is 
used a policy independent variable.  
 In accordance with Tchamyou (2016), five control variables are adopted, namely: 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth; population growth; foreign direct investment; private 
domestic credit and foreign aid. From intuition, we expect all the control variables to have a 
positive influence on conditions for entrepreneurship. However, it is also important to note 
that some expected signs may depend on market dynamism and expansion. For instance, 
foreign aid and private domestic credit may be more sensitive to some dimensions of doing 
business than others. The intuition for these expected signs is consistent with Tchamyou 
(2016).  
 The definition of the variables and corresponding sources are provided in Appendix 1 
whereas the summary statistics are disclosed in Appendix 2. The correlation matrix which is 
used to reduce potential concerns about multicollinearity is provided in Appendix 3. 
 
3. 2 Methodology 
 The Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach is adopted for the 
following five reasons. First, the number of countries or cross-sections (N or 49) is 
substantially higher than the periodicity per cross-section (T or 13). Second, the doing of 
business dependent variables are persistent because correlation coefficients with their 
respective first lags are higher than the rule thumb threshold of 0.800. As shown in Appendix 
4, the correlation coefficient between the cost of business start-up procedure and its first lag is 
0.928; this is also the case with the number of procedures to enforce a contract (0.997); start-
up procedures to register a business (0.940);  time required to build a warehouse (0.964); time 
required to enforce a contract (0.983); time required to register a property(0.918); time 
required to start a business (0.926); time to export (0.976); time to prepare and pay taxes  
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(0.992) and time to resolve an insolvency (0.999). Third, given that the GMM estimation 
technique is consistent with a panel data structure, cross-country variations are not eliminated 
in the estimations. Fourth, the system estimator considers inherent biases in the difference 
estimator. Fifth, the estimation procedure accounts for endogeneity by controlling for 
simultaneity in the explanatory variables using an instrumentation process. Moreover, usage 
of time-invariant omitted variables also helps to mitigate  the consequences of endogeneity 
bias.   
 In accordance with Bond et al. (2001), the system GMM estimator (see Arellano & 
Bond, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) has better estimation properties when compared to the 
difference estimator (see Arellano & Bond, 1991). In this study, we opt for the Roodman 
(2009ab) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) because it has been documented to restrict 
the proliferation of instruments and control for dependence among cross-sections (see Love & 
Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; Boateng et al., 2016). Hence, the extended estimation 
procedure adopts forward orthogonal deviations as opposed to first differences. A two-step 
procedure is adopted instead of a one-step approach because it addresses concerns of 
heteroscedasticity given that the one-step procedure only controls for homoscedasticity.  
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiB ,  
is a doing business indicator in  country i
 
at  period t ,  is a constant,
 
G  is 
governance (political stability, voice & accountability, government effectiveness, regulation 
quality, corruption-control and rule of law),  M  represents mobile phone penetration, GM is 
the interaction between governance and mobile phone penetration, 
 
W  is the vector of control 
variables (GDP growth, population growth, foreign direct investment, private domestic credit 
and foreign aid),  represents the coefficient of auto-regression, t  
is the time-specific 
constant,
 i

 
is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 It is appropriate to devote space to discussing identification properties and exclusion 
restrictions in the GMM specification. All independent indicators are acknowledged as 
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predetermined or suspected endogenous.  Additionally, exclusively time-invariant omitted 
variables or years are considered to be strictly exogenous (also Boateng et al., 2016; Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2016b). The intuition for the consideration builds from the fact that it is not 
likely for the time-invariant omitted variables to become endogenous after a first difference 
(Roodman, 2009)
3
.  
 In the light of above emphasis, the time-invariant omitted variables impact the 
outcome variable exclusively through the predetermined variables. Furthermore, the statistical 
relevance of the exclusion restriction is investigated with the Difference in Hansen Test 
(DHT) for instrument exogeneity.  Accordingly, the null hypothesis of the DHT should not be 
rejected for the time-invariant indicators to explain the doing business variables exclusively 
through the suspected endogenous variables. Hence, in the findings that are reported in 
Section 4, the assumption of exclusion restriction is validated if the alternative hypothesis of 
the DHT related to instrumental variables (IV) (year, eq(diff)) is not accepted. This is broadly 
in accordance with the standard IV procedure in which, a rejection of the null hypothesis of 
the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test is an indication that the instruments affect 
the doing business variables beyond the suggested predetermined variable channels (see Beck 
et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c).  
 
4.  Empirical results  
4. 1 Presentation of results  
Table 1, Table 2, Table 3, Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, Table 7, Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10 
respectively present findings corresponding to the:  cost of business start-up procedure; 
procedure to enforce a contract; start-up procedures to register a business; time required to 
build a warehouse; time required to enforce a contract; time required to register a property; 
time required to start a business; time to export; time to prepare and pay taxes and time to 
resolve an insolvency. For all tables: (i) four information criteria are employed to assess the 
validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal deviations
4
 and (ii) a net effect is 
computed to assess the effect of mobile phones in governance for doing business.  For 
                                                          
3 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
4 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 
2016, p.9). 
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instance, in Table 1, in the second column, the net effect from the interaction between mobile 
phones and political stability is -8.119 ([0.110× 23.379] + [-10.691]),  where: the mean value 
of mobile phone penetration is 23.379, the unconditional effect of political stability is -10.691  
while the conditional effect from the interaction between political stability and mobile phones 
is 0.110.  
 The following findings can be established on the linkages between mobile phone 
penetration, governance and doing business.  
First, the net effect of mobile phones in governance is consistently negative on the 
cost of start-up procedures.  
Second, the net effect of mobile phones in governance for the number of procedures to 
enforce a contract is positive for political stability and negative for the rule of law. For the 
remaining governance variables, whereas the unconditional effects are insignificant, the 
corresponding marginal effects are consistently negative. In other words, an additional unit of 
mobile phone penetration interacts with the governance variables to decrease the number of 
procedures needed to enforce a contract.  
Third, in Table 3, there is a positive net effect on the number of procedures to register 
a business from the interaction between regulation quality and mobile phones and positive 
marginal effects are apparent from regressions pertaining to political stability and the rule of 
law.  
Fourth, in spite of positive marginal effects on the time required to build a warehouse, 
there are negative net effects from interactions with political stability, regulation quality and 
the rule of law.  
Fifth, with regard to the time required to enforce a contract, there is (i) a positive net 
effect from voice and accountability, despite a corresponding negative marginal effect and (ii) 
positive marginal impact from the interaction with government effectiveness.  
Sixth, in Table 6 on the time required to register a property (i) with the exception of 
interactions with government effectiveness, there are negative marginal effects from the 
interaction of mobile phones with other governance variables and (ii) there are positive net 
effects from political stability, voice and accountability and the rule of law.  
Seventh, both the unconditional and conditional effects are not overwhelmingly 
significant in Table 7, with the exceptions of positive unconditional and conditional effects 
from respectively voice and accountability and regulation quality.   
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Eight, there is a positive (negative) net effect from political stability (regulation 
quality) with a corresponding negative (positive) marginal effect in Table 8.   
Ninth, in Table 9 on the linkages between governance and mobile phone penetration, 
there is a positive (i) net effect from political stability, with a corresponding negative marginal 
effect and (ii) marginal effect from the interaction with regulation quality.  
Tenth, on the time to resolve insolvency, there are consistently positive marginal 
effects across specifications and negative net effects from political stability, regulation 
quality, corruption-control and the rule of law, in Table 10
5
.  Most of the significant control 
variables have the expected signs.  
 
“Insert Tables 1-10 here” 
 
 
4. 2 Further discussion of results and policy implications 
4.2.1 Implications for policy 
 For the most part, our findings have shown that when governance channels are 
complemented with  ICT in the perspective of mobile phone penetration, the outcome on 
doing business can be positive. This is essentially because when the net effects from the 
underlying interaction on the cost of and constraints to doing business are not positive, the 
corresponding marginal impacts are negative. Three practical implications result from the 
above, namely: (i) creating favourable conditions that enhance mobile phone penetration; (ii) 
enhancing governance standards so as to decrease the negative skew of governance variables 
and (iii) improving the environment surrounding the complementarity of mobile phones with 
governance mechanisms. In what follows, these points are engaged in chronological order. 
 First, as discussed in the introduction, compared to other regions of the world, the 
penetration potential for mobile phones is highest in Africa. The specific context of SSA is 
confirmed by Asongu et al. (2016) who maintain that while the usage of mobile phones is 
lowest in SSA, the corresponding growth rate is highest in the sub-region. Therefore, in order 
to leverage on such penetration potential for development externalities like business and/or 
entrepreneurship opportunities, policy reforms should address concerns related to the lack of 
infrastructure and limited affordability which are important access barriers to mobile phone 
usage. Universal coverage schemes via non-profit activities and low pricing on the one hand 
                                                          
5
 It is important to note that owing to concerns in instrument proliferation and  issues in degrees of freedom, four 
instead of five control variables are used for the specifications in Table 10.  
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and the liberalisation of the ICT sector and provision of basic mobile phone infrastructure on 
the other, are steps in the right direction to boosting mobile phone penetration.  
 Second, most of the governance variables are negatively skewed (see summary 
statistics) which implies that when governance is already very poor and negatively affects the 
doing of business, the complementary effect of mobile phone penetration may not lead to the 
desired results unless improvements in governance standards are undertaken in conjunction 
with improvements in a favourable environment for the interaction between mobile phones 
and governance. 
 Third, our findings for the most part have shown that the mobile phone can be 
employed as a valuable complementary tool in the role of governance in the doing of 
business. Therefore, policy actions could improve such complementarity to enhance 
entrepreneurial activities by involving at least two reform measures. They are: (i) tailoring 
mobile phones to boost openness, transparency and free flow of data/information between 
various government institutions and departments and (ii) strengthening mobile-governance 
applications and services in order to enhance the free flow of information between 
corporations and government institutions as well as to enable businesses to actively 
participate in decisions that affect the doing of business.  
 In the light of the above, the mobile telephony can act as a participative interface 
between the government and corporations on the one hand and emerging entrepreneurs on the 
other. For these purposes, policies on mobile phone penetration need to be designed to boost, 
among others: cost-effectiveness, efficiency, adoption, interaction, outreach and access along 
the following lines.  
First, with regard to ‘increasing outreach’ owing to issues in infrastructure networks, it 
is essential to increase the ownership of mobile phones in remote areas (especially rural 
regions) that do not have the infrastructure that can accommodate the internet and other 
communication and transportation facilities. Second, providing entrepreneurs with the means 
of communicating with the help of mobile phones anywhere and anytime is a step in the 
direction. Third, the connection between entrepreneurs and government institutions with the 
help of mobile phones is more effective in certain specific scenarios, compared to more 
traditional media like posters, radios, brochures and public speeches. Fourth, business 
activities may be substantially enhanced if mobile phones are designed to be integral part of 
the interface between government institutions and entrepreneurs (present and potential).  
Fifth, communications between entrepreneurs and government institutions can also be 
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enhanced if mobile phone applications are tailored to favour feedbacks and suggestions from 
entrepreneurs in the doing of business. Sixth, consistent with the narrative in the previous 
paragraph, affordability of and access to mobile phones can be improved in remote/rural areas 
by inter alia: subsidising community ownership and mobile infrastructure for collective 
entrepreneurial projects  
 Overall, if governance standards are improved and mobile phone penetration levels 
increased across SSA, the major unemployment concern owing to a growing population in 
Africa in the post-2015 development agenda can be addressed through private sector 
activities. It is important to note that Asongu (2013) has concluded that in the long term, only 
the private sector can accommodate unemployment resulting from Africa’s burgeoning 
population.  
4.2. 2 Implications for theory  
It is apparent from the findings that some doing business indicators are more stationary (or 
non-persistent or convergent) than others. For instance three main tendencies are apparent. 
They are: (i) consistently stationary (cost of business start-up procedures; time required to 
build a warehouse;  time required to register a property and time to prepare and pay taxes); (ii) 
consistently non-stationary (time required to enforce a contract; time required to start a 
business and time to resolve an insolvency) and (iii) both stationary and non-stationary 
(procedures to enforce a contract;  start-up procedures to register business and time to export) 
variables. The information criterion of convergence is when the absolute value corresponding 
to the lagged estimated outcome variable is between zero and one (see Fung, 2009; Asongu, 
2014).  
 The evidence of some form of convergence between specific doing business indicators 
implies that common policies on the doing of business and/or entrepreneurship that are 
contingent on governance and mobile phone penetration can be feasibly adopted across 
countries within a timeline conditional on the time to full convergence. The intuition for the 
theoretical implication is consistent with the income catch-up literature which has been  
extensively documented within frameworks of neoclassical growth models (Baumol, 1986; 
Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995) and recently extended 
to other fields of economic development, notably:  inclusive development (Mayer-Foulkes, 
2010); financial market performance (Bruno et al., 2012; Narayan et al., 2011) and 
macroeconomic and institutional factors that are conducive to socio-political unrest (Asongu 
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& Nwachukwu, 2016d). A common underpinning between the contemporary and non-
contemporary literature is that decreasing cross-country differences in investigated outcome 
variables is a basis for the adoption of common policies on the corresponding outcome 
variables.  
 
5. Conclusion and future research directions 
This study has investigated the role of mobile phones in governance for doing business in 
Sub-Saharan Africa with data for the period 2000-2012 by employing the Generalised Method 
of Moments. Three broad concepts of governance have been used. They are: (i) political 
(involving voice & accountability and political stability/no violence), (ii) economic 
(comprising government effectiveness and regulation quality) and (iii) institutional (covering 
corruption-control and rule of law). Ten dimensions of entrepreneurship were considered.   
Two main findings were established with respect to the net effects from the interaction 
between mobile phones and governance dynamics: They comprise: (i) a reduction in the cost 
of business start-up procedure, the time to build a warehouse and the time to resolve an 
insolvency and (ii) an increase in the start-up procedure to register a business; the time 
required to enforce a contract; the time required to register a property and time to prepare and 
pay taxes.  When net effects are unfavourable, the corresponding marginal impacts are 
favourable to entrepreneurship for the most part.  Implications for policy and theory have 
been discussed. 
 Further research can focus on other instruments through which the mobile phone can 
be used to enhance entrepreneurship and the doing of business in Africa. Considering mobile 
phone complementarities like the internet, the degree of innovation and the quality of 
education are steps in this direction.  While there is currently a constraint in the availability of 
mobile banking data, assessing how the established findings withstand empirical scrutiny with 
mobile banking data would improve on the extant literature.  
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Table 1: Governance, mobile phones and cost of business start-up procedures 
       
 Dependent variable: Cost of business start-up procedures 
       
   Political 
Stability 
 (PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  
(CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
       
Constant  5.421 -6.476 14.330** -16.883 9.309 -5.751 
 (0.661) (0.511) (0.039) (0.174) (0.274) (0.491) 
Cost of start-up procedure (-1) 0.752*** 0.739*** 0.742*** 0.737*** 0.752*** 0.739*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) -0.258*** -0.211*** -0.259*** -0.131* -0.348*** -0.114* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.050) (0.000) (0.073) 
Political Stability -10.691*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.002)      
Voice & Accountability --- -17.184*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.001)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -16.040*** --- --- --- 
   (0.002)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- -22.491*** --- --- 
    (0.005)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- -13.257*** --- 
     (0.004)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- -26.112*** 
      (0.000) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob 0.110** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.020)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.110* --- --- --- --- 
  (0.065)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.087* --- --- --- 
   (0.096)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.210*** --- --- 
    (0.001)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.175*** --- 
     (0.004)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- 0.280*** 
      (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.415* 0.189 0.338 0.194 0.090 0.094 
 (0.076) (0.498) (0.232) (0.467) (0.738) (0.661) 
Population growth  9.822** 13.917*** 6.408** 19.525*** 8.665** 13.735*** 
 (0.038) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.014) (0.001) 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.303*** 0.191** 0.013 0.272*** 0.332*** 0.193*** 
 (0.000) (0.038) (0.829) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Foreign Aid -1.331*** -1.433*** -1.500*** -1.782*** -1.596*** -1.564*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit  0.255 0.282 0.148 0.243 0.176 0.132 
 (0.126) (0.173) (0.339) (0.289) (0.271) (0.375) 
       
Net Effects  -8.119 -14.612 -14.006 -17.581 -9.165 -19.565 
       
AR(1) (0.154) (0.154) (0.160) (0.155) (0.156) (0.157) 
AR(2) (0.465) (0.402) (0.410) (0.362) (0.368) (0.386) 
Sargan OIR (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Hansen OIR (0.581) (0.456) (0.216) (0.494) (0.410) (0.615) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.234) (0.169) (0.200) (0.391) (0.169) (0.281) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.771) (0.703) (0.317) (0.525) (0.643) (0.764) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.719) (0.377) (0.216) (0.429) (0.435) (0.518) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.268) (0.555) (0.345) (0.537) (0.365) (0.625) 
       
Fisher  3991.84*** 7194.48*** 12591.09*** 13910.87*** 3775.29*** 5831.21*** 
Instruments  42 42 42 42 42 42 
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Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  312 312 312 312 312 312 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
 
Table 2: Governance, mobile phones and procedures to enforce a contract 
       
 Dependent variable: Procedures to enforce a contract 
       
   Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  
(CC) 
Rule of 
Law (RL) 
       
Constant  -0.508 0.270 -0.463* -0.292 -0.595** 1.177** 
 (0.223) (0.487) (0.067) (0.346) (0.021) (0.023) 
Procedure to enforce a contract (-1) 1.019*** 0.988*** 1.015*** 1.008*** 1.018*** 0.967*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0009* -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.001** 
 (0.316) (0.375) (0.084) (0.195) (0.386) (0.042) 
Political Stability 0.105*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.007)      
Voice & Accountability --- -0.073 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.149)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- 0.057 --- --- --- 
   (0.338)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- 0.009 --- --- 
    (0.902)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- 0.035 --- 
     (0.388)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- -0.151** 
      (0.034) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.001*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- -0.001*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.009)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- -0.002*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- -0.001*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- -0.001*** --- 
     (0.000)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- -0.003*** 
      (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.002 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 
 (0.100) (0.321) (0.075) (0.599) (0.002) (0.319) 
Population growth  -0.095*** -0.021 -0.060*** -0.033 -0.066*** -0.026 
 (0.004) (0.608) (0.003) (0.222) (0.000) (0.323) 
Foreign Direct Investment -0.002*** -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.001** 0.0002 -0.002* 
 (0.008) (0.762) (0.708) (0.039) (0.784) (0.073) 
Foreign Aid 0.00002 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 0.00008 -0.0003 
 (0.958) (0.154) (0.263) (0.342) (0.803) (0.334) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.0005 0.004** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004** 
 (0.429) (0.048) (0.033) (0.003) (0.001) (0.024) 
       
Net Effects  0.081 na na na na -0.221 
       
AR(1) (0.060) (0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.060) 
AR(2) (0.166) (0.134) (0.146) (0.156) (0.138) (0.139) 
Sargan OIR (0.581) (0.063) (0.926) (0.943) (0.933) (0.238) 
Hansen OIR (0.863) (0.684) (0.729) (0.871) (0.490) (0.631) 
DHT for instruments       
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(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.382) (0.443) (0.743) (0.559) (0.707) (0.359) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.942) (0.720) (0.581) (0.882) (0.325) (0.717) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.777) (0.943) (0.617) (0.822) (0.774) (0.919) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.748) (0.118) (0.698) (0.683) (0.129) (0.111) 
       
Fisher  46847.80*** 26615.62*** 152693.3*** 127891.1*** 17994.8*** 14416.7*** 
Instruments  42 42 42 42 42 42 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  312 312 312 312 312 312 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
Table 3: Governance, mobile phones and start-up procedures to register a business 
       
 Dependent variable: Start-up procedures to register a business  
       
   Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of 
Law (RL) 
       
Constant  -0.468 0.047 0.808** 0.073 0.611* 0.282 
 (0.136) (0.907) (0.034) (0.817) (0.077) (0.324) 
Procedures to register a business(-1) 1.011*** 1.018*** 0.982*** 1.012*** 0.996*** 1.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.0004 0.0006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0003 
 (0.867) (0.758) (0.366) (0.502) (0.376) (0.845) 
Political Stability -0.081 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.243)      
Voice & Accountability --- 0.379*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- 0.194 --- --- --- 
   (0.277)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- 0.221* --- --- 
    (0.065)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- 0.223 --- 
     (0.132)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- -0.009 
      (0.912) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob 0.004*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.007)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- -0.0002 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.901)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.002 --- --- --- 
   (0.166)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.005** --- --- 
    (0.025)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.002 --- 
     (0.196)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- 0.006*** 
      (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.0008 0.001 -0.001 -0.007 0.000004 0.0009 
 (0.857) (0.760) (0.706) (0.179) (0.999) (0.824) 
Population growth  -0.005 0.001 -0.018 -0.016 0.006 -0.051 
 (0.935) (0.979) (0.778) (0.751) (0.908) (0.338) 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Private Domestic Credit  -0.008*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.021*** 0.039 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.407) 
       
Net Effects  na na na 0.337 na na 
       
AR(1) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
AR(2) (0.717) (0.708) (0.664) (0.703) (0.715) (0.690) 
Sargan OIR (0.034) (0.035) (0.068) (0.141) (0.114) (0.040) 
Hansen OIR (0.142) (0.348) (0.668) (0.260) (0.340) (0.240) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.262) (0.167) (0.192) (0.139) (0.416) (0.132) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.165) (0.560) (0.892) (0.468) (0.321) (0.444) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.134) (0.340) (0.727) (0.368) (0.405) (0.159) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.344) (0.400) (0.387) (0.207) (0.288) (0.571) 
       
Fisher  9753.58*** 1354.60*** 2084.74*** 5362.74*** 1806.21*** 751.08*** 
Instruments  42 42 42 42 42 42 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  312 312 312 312 312 312 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
 
Table 4: Governance, mobile phones and time required to build a warehouse 
       
 Dependent variable: Time required to build a warehouse 
       
   Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
       
Constant  3.403 19.388*** 16.660*** 16.374*** 25.011*** 11.944** 
 (0.433) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) 
Time to build a warehouse (-1) 0.992*** 0.927*** 0.946*** 0.909*** 0.920*** 0.944*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) -0.036 -0.038 -0.049 0.040 -0.055 0.008 
 (0.115) (0.295) (0.176) (0.283) (0.190) (0.771) 
Political Stability -2.645*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.005)      
Voice & Accountability --- -2.060 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.132)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -1.722 --- --- --- 
   (0.316)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- -5.610* --- --- 
    (0.054)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- -0.701 --- 
     (0.732)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- -5.458*** 
      (0.003) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob 0.050** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.011)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.009 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.709)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.023 --- --- --- 
   (0.383)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.094** --- --- 
    (0.014)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.004 --- 
     (0.876)  
20 
 
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- 0.087*** 
      (0.001) 
GDP growth 0.128** 0.079 0.095 0.046 -0.055 0.089 
 (0.037) (0.319) (0.151) (0.527) (0.334) (0.274) 
Population growth  -0.831 -2.305** -2.253** -0.366 -3.029*** -1.089 
 (0.358) (0.030) (0.020) (0.758) (0.004) (0.248) 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.235*** 0.126*** 0.115*** 0.189*** 0.158*** 0.170*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid -0.323*** -0.222*** -0.232*** -0.286*** -0.245*** -0.284*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.002 -0.076 2.087 -0.057 -0.081 -0.063 
 (0.959) (0.108) (0.143) (0.359) (0.137) (0.243) 
       
Net Effects  -1.476 na na -3.412 na -3.424 
       
AR(1) (0.124) (0.122) (0.123) (0.120) (0.122) (0.121) 
AR(2) (0.152) (0.172) (0.169) (0.155) (0.166) (0.165) 
Sargan OIR (0.239) (0.574) (0.565) (0.572) (0.199) (0.576) 
Hansen OIR (0.450) (0.979) (0.927) (0.792) (0.838) (0.960) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.819) (0.314) (0.221) (0.216) (0.236) (0.243) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.234) (1.000) (0.998) (0.958) (0.973) (1.000) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.588) (0.918) (0.892) (0.748) (0.746) (0.886) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.203) (0.973) (0.711) (0.604) (0.764) (0.933) 
       
Fisher  4368.05*** 7643.51*** 5318.15*** 2133.00*** 3538.49*** 3629.85*** 
Instruments  40 40 40 40 40 40 
Countries  43 43 43 43 43 43 
Observations  248 248 248 248 248 248 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Governance, mobile phones and time required to enforce a contract 
       
 Dependent variable: Time required to enforce a contract 
       
   Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality 
(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of 
Law (RL) 
       
Constant  26.631*** 22.366*** 27.787** 19.902** 15.948* 33.392*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.014) (0.062) (0.001) 
Time to enforce  a contract (-1) 1.004*** 1.010*** 1.042*** 1.027*** 1.041*** 1.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) -0.061 -0.140** -0.192*** -0.112** -0.108** -0.096 
 (0.290) (0.018) (0.009) (0.016) (0.033) (0.199) 
Political Stability 3.247*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.001)      
Voice & Accountability --- 6.379** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.025)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -0.107 --- --- --- 
   (0.978)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- 0.506 --- --- 
    (0.874)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- -0.558 --- 
     (0.854)  
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Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- -5.420 
      (0.197) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.022 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.279)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- -0.098** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.042)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.142** --- --- --- 
   (0.018)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.033 --- --- 
    (0.613)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.013 --- 
     (0.679)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- -0.011 
      (0.793) 
GDP growth 0.728** 0.591** 1.135*** 0.887*** 0.733*** 0.786*** 
 (0.012) (0.022) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Population growth  -7.884*** -10.502*** -13.004*** -10.140*** -11.395*** -14.841*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment -0.047 -0.052 -0.238*** -0.202*** -0.224*** -0.042 
 (0.393) (0.326) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.420) 
Foreign Aid 0.032 0.012 -0.006 -0.003 0.022 0.105** 
 (0.494) (0.731) (0.886) (0.917) (0.560) (0.010) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.423*** -0.310*** -0.470** -0.370** -0.483*** -0.354*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.020) (0.033) (0.001) (0.008) 
       
Net Effects  na 4.087 na na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) 
AR(2) (0.859) (0.693) (0.954) (0.915) (0.934) (0.670) 
Sargan OIR (0.445) (0.306) (0.510) (0.627) (0.331) (0.410) 
Hansen OIR (0.832) (0.937) (0.303) (0.768) (0.383) (0.719) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.765) (0.685) (0.484) (0.631) (0.592) (0.488) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.716) (0.922) (0.244) (0.706) (0.276) (0.733) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.747) (0.736) (0.429) (0.724) (0.415) (0.562) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.720) (0.988) (0.206) (0.598) (0.347) (0.772) 
       
Fisher  217058.87*** 10678.92*** 8469.18*** 12375.8*** 14951.12*** 9959.80*** 
Instruments  42 42 42 42 42 42 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  312 312 312 312 312 312 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
 
Table 6: Governance, mobile phones and time required to register a property 
       
 Dependent variable: Time required to register a property 
       
    
   Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness  
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  
(CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
       
Constant  22.652** 26.822*** 12.041 24.546*** 5.422 22.382** 
 (0.010) (0.001) (0.136) (0.006) (0.263) (0.030) 
Time to register a property (-1) 0.783*** 0.760*** 0.767***  0.762*** 0.823*** 0.801*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) -0.041 -0.119*** -0.011 -0.072 0.021 -0.079 
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 (0.452) (0.001) (0.865) (0.348) (0.712) (0.218) 
Political Stability 4.502** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.038)      
Voice & Accountability --- 7.156*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.007)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -3.097 --- --- --- 
   (0.379)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- -4.583 --- --- 
    (0.279)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- 4.322 --- 
     (0.113)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- 7.336** 
      (0.011) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.096*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.007)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- -0.153*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- -0.075 --- --- --- 
   (0.117)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- -0.133** --- --- 
    (0.039)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- -0.113** --- 
     (0.025)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- -0.191*** 
      (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.682*** 0.673** 0.834*** 0.694*** 0.926*** 0.745*** 
 (0.009) (0.036) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
Population growth  -2.950 -2.737 -1.287 -4.799** 1.022 -3.364 
 (0.145) (0.218) (0.493) (0.026) (0.284) (0.158) 
Foreign Direct Investment -0.224*** -0.333*** -0.165** -0.206* -0.163* -0.233** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.036) (0.057) (0.072) (0.021) 
Foreign Aid 0.042* 0.020 -0.014 0.016 -0.022 0.090** 
 (0.087) (0.537) (0.732) (0.660) (0.556) (0.029) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.072 -0.048 -0.048 0.098 -0.109 -0.093 
 (0.246) (0.539) (0.481) (0.316) (0.245) (0.147) 
       
Net Effects  2.257 3.579 na na na 2.870 
       
AR(1) (0.079) (0.082) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.077) 
AR(2) (0.325) (0.327) (0.323) (0.332) (0.333) (0.321) 
Sargan OIR (0.927) (0.974) (0.883) (0.595) (0.737) (0.939) 
Hansen OIR (0.827) (0.884) (0.936) (0.571) (0.785) (0.726) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.852) (0.710) (0.762) (0.266) (0.981) (0.946) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.647) (0.829) (0.892) (0.727) (0.438) (0.415) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.754) (0.760) (0.920) (0.790) (0.936) (0.762) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.696) (0.864) (0.659) (0.161) (0.196) (0.421) 
       
Fisher  44329.73*** 3157.16*** 1340.01*** 4019.59*** 2504.42*** 3414.33*** 
Instruments  41 41 41 41 41 41 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  282 282 282 282 282 282 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
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Table 7: Governance, mobile phones and time required to start a business  
       
 Dependent variable: Time required to start a business  
       
   Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of 
Law (RL) 
       
Constant  -11.281* -5.836 -10.292** 10.747 -9.704** -17.780*** 
 (0.080) (0.463) (0.045) (0.140) (0.032) (0.002) 
Time required to start a business (-1) 1.203*** 1.224*** 1.193*** 1.264*** 1.122*** 1.227*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) -0.050 -0.080 0.031 -0.031 0.013 0.023 
 (0.263) (0.151) (0.573) (0.504) (0.754) (0.685) 
Political Stability -0.598 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.703)      
Voice & Accountability --- 5.791** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.017)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- 2.483 --- --- --- 
   (0.359)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- 4.033 --- --- 
    (0.306)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- 1.967 --- 
     (0.490)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- 0.796 
      (0.767) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.009 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.792)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.040 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.458)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.099 --- --- --- 
   (0.185)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.243*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.034 --- 
     (0.437)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- 0.088 
      (0.240) 
GDP growth 0.187** 0.163*** 0.117 0.070 0.189*** 0.200*** 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.200) (0.431) (0.004) (0.007) 
Population growth  -1.383 -1.322 1.586 -3.620* 1.965 0.470 
 (0.472) (0.516à (0.354) (0.054) (0.164) (0.810) 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.169*** 0.102** 0.258*** 0.246*** 0.116** 0.217*** 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.001) 
Foreign Aid 0.033 -0.086** -0.012 0.015 0.038 0.025 
 (0.263) (0.021) (0.735) (0.654) (0.241) (0.516) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.175** -0.281* -0.134 -0.341** -0.131 -0.137 
 (0.040) (0.060) (0.258) (0.027) (0.191) (0.262) 
       
Net Effects  na na na na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.042) (0.034) (0.039) (0.033) (0.042) (0.038) 
AR(2) (0.824) (0.822) (0.861) (0.850) (0.788) (0.826) 
Sargan OIR (0.007) (0.004) (0.019) (0.009) (0.001) (0.014) 
Hansen OIR (0.849) (0.513) (0.641) (0.754) (0.831) (0.698) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.264) (0.223) (0.283) (0.215) (0.166) (0.303) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.970) (0.704) (0.791) (0.937) (0.988) (0.834) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.941) (0.842) (0.589) (0.870) (0.806) (0.863) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.322) (0.100) (0.556) (0.305) (0.599) (0.238) 
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Fisher  838.09*** 884.08*** 2008.87*** 1446.52*** 1011.74*** 731.88*** 
Instruments  42 42 42 42 42 42 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  312 312 312 312 312 312 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
 
Table 8: Governance, mobile phones and time to export 
       
 Dependent variable: Time to export 
       
   Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
       
Constant  -1.435 -1.586* -2.236*** -4.802*** -1.045 -0.704 
 (0.135) (0.079) (0.002) (0.000) (0.141) (0.393) 
Time to export (-1) 1.004*** 1.002*** 0.994*** 0.997*** 1.002*** 1.024*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.007 0.008 0.014*** 0.035*** 0.005 0.002 
 (0.126) (0.121) (0.007) (0.000) (0.245) (0.628) 
Political Stability 1.135*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Voice & Accountability --- -0.366 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.199)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -0.723* --- --- --- 
   (0.078)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- -2.337*** --- --- 
    (0.002)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- -0.324 --- 
     (0.400)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- 0.022 
      (0.957) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.013*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.004)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.002 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.576)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.003 --- --- --- 
   (0.495)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.022** --- --- 
    (0.018)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.0003 --- 
     (0.922)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- -0.002 
      (0.504 
GDP growth -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.046*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.048*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population growth  0.067 -0.060 0.146 0.591** -0.304 -0.616*** 
 (0.825) (0.802) (0.448) (0.023) (0.186) (0.002) 
Foreign Direct Investment -0.030*** -0.018*** -0.024*** -0.012** -0.021*** -0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.010 0.0003 0.004 0.016** -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.233) (0.973) (0.463) (0.012) (0.870) (0.725) 
       
Net Effects  0.831 na na -1.822 na na 
       
AR(1) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
AR(2) (0.684) (0.628) (0.599) (0.597) (0.642) (0.611) 
Sargan OIR (0.932) (0.843) (0.682) (0.187) (0.776) (0.748) 
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Hansen OIR (0.337) (0.406) (0.290) (0.382) (0.298) (0.332) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.553) (0.511) (0.477) (0.492) (0.851) (0.338) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.248) (0.341) (0.234) (0.324) (0.115) (0.362) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.500) (0.278) (0.178) (0.316) (0.366) (0.200) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.154) (0.731) (0.738) (0.546) (0.245) (0.783) 
       
Fisher  6172.95*** 4858.44*** 3994.85*** 7273.29*** 7356.54*** 3979.05*** 
Instruments  40 40 40 40 40 40 
Countries  43 43 43 43 43 43 
Observations  248 248 248 248 248 248 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
 
Table 9: Governance, mobile phones and time to prepare and pay taxes 
       
 Dependent variable: Time to prepare and pay taxes 
       
   Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
       
Constant  24.808*** 18.955*** 11.470 19.336** 12.461* 22.569** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.196) (0.020) (0.098) (0.023) 
Time to prepare and pay taxes (-1) 0.997*** 0.959*** 0.962*** 0.972*** 0.925*** 0.951*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.038 0.099** 0.147** 0.105** 0.246*** 0.142*** 
 (0.380) (0.029) (0.011) (0.036) (0.000) (0.008) 
Political Stability 5.476** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.038)      
Voice & Accountability --- -4.368 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.199)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -8.662* --- --- --- 
   (0.058)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- -7.113 --- --- 
    (0.119)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- -16.062*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- -6.261 
      (0.163) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.057** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.040)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.031 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.386)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.057 --- --- --- 
   (0.104)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.124*** --- --- 
    (0.008)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.042 --- 
     (0.155)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- 0.004 
      (0.898) 
GDP growth -0.447*** -0.243* -0.202 -0.186 -0.268** -0.387*** 
 (0.004) (0.059) (0.133) (0.163) (0.026) (0.007) 
Population growth  -4.554** -2.145 -1.043 -3.578* -0.593 -3.376 
 (0.011) (0.121) (0.628) (0.092) (0.701) (0.138) 
Foreign Direct Investment -0.175*** -0.153*** -0.132*** -0.115** -0.258*** -0.216*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.049) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Foreign Aid 0.095*** -0.017 -0.045 -0.025 -0.161*** -0.046* 
 (0.000) (0.315) (0.175) (0.272) (0.005) (0.077) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.389*** -0.220*** -0.196* -0.362*** -0.186*** -0.264** 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.078) (0.000) (0.002) (0.012) 
       
Net Effects  4.143 na na na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.057) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.045) (0.051) 
AR(2) (0.239) (0.185) (0.181) (0.192) (0.191) (0.198) 
Sargan OIR (0.919) (0.923) (0.934) (0.885) (0.753) (0.829) 
Hansen OIR (0.198) (0.838) (0.820) (0.627) (0.828) (0.823) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.813) (0.527) (0.845) (0.432) (0.599) (0.871) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.070) (0.856) (0.641) (0.658) (0.806) (0.624) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.282) (0.710) (0.860) (0.690) (0.801) (0.630) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.181) (0.851) (0.402) (0.335) (0.583) (0.955) 
       
Fisher  22126.09*** 22232.50*** 8664.48*** 283816.1*** 9800.48*** 19413.02*** 
Instruments  40 40 40 40 40 40 
Countries  43 43 43 43 43 43 
Observations  248 248 248 248 248 248 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
 
 
Table 10: Governance, mobile phones and time to resolve insolvency 
       
 Dependent variable: Time to resolve insolvency   
       
   Political 
Stability 
(PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability 
(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
       
Constant  -0.017*** -0.038*** -0.091*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.069*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Time to resolve insolvency (-1) 1.003*** 1.011*** 1.024*** 1.015*** 1.017*** 1.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.00009*** 0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Political Stability -0.003*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Voice & Accountability --- -0.002 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.336)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -0.005 --- --- --- 
   (0.133)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- -0.006** --- --- 
    (0.027)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- -0.009** --- 
     (0.042)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- -0.004* 
      (0.073) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob 0.00004*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.00003* --- --- --- --- 
  (0.087)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.0001*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.0001*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
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‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.0001*** --- 
     (0.000)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- 0.0001*** 
      (0.000) 
GDP growth -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0002* 
 (0.022) (0.135) (0.066) (0.007) (0.025) (0.054) 
Population growth  0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.002** 
 (0.004) (0.112) (0.144) (0.001) (0.176) (0.013) 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.00006** 0.00002 -0.00002 -0.0001 -0.00001 0.00004 
 (0.037) (0.478) (0.746) (0.119) (0.801) (0.174) 
Foreign Aid 0.00001 -0.000009 -0.00002 0.00005 -0.00001 -0.00002** 
 (0.689) (0.636) (0.437) (0.199) (0.310) (0.034) 
       
Net Effects  -0.002 na na -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 
       
AR(1) (0.314) (0.316) (0.316) (0.315) (0.316) (0.314) 
AR(2) (0.996) (0.560) (0.655) (0.763) (0.961) (0.525) 
Sargan OIR (0.941) (0.638) (0.822) (0.704) (0.416) (0.777) 
Hansen OIR (0.699) (0.931) (0.741) (0.757) (0.772) (0.510) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.986) (0.991) (0.948) (0.967) (0.681) (0.960) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.336) (0.688) (0.438) (0.433) (0.678) (0.205) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.982) (0.968) (0.965) (0.566) (0.933) (0.749) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.092) (0.484) (0.154) (0.819) (0.248) (0.181) 
       
Fisher  3.85e+06*** 3.45e+06*** 9.72e+06*** 8.21e+06 849695.9*** 2.22e+06*** 
Instruments  38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries  38 38 38 38 38 38 
Observations  284 284 284 284 284 284 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effects is not significant.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1:  Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables (Measurement) Sources 
    
Cost of starting 
business 
Costostart Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per 
capita) 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Contract 
enforcement 
Contractenf Procedures to enforce a contract (number) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Start-up 
procedure 
Startupproced Start-up procedures to register a business (number) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Ware house time Timewarehouse Time required to build a warehouse (days) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Time to enforce a 
contract 
Timenforcontr Timenforcontr: Time required to enforce a contract 
(days) 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Time to register a 
property 
Timeregprop Time required to register a property (days) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Time to start a 
business 
Timestartbus Time required to start a business (days) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Time to export Timexport Time to export (days) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Time to pay 
taxes  
Timetaxes Time to prepare and pay taxes (hours) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Resolving an 
insolvency 
Timeresinsolv Time to resolve insolvency (years) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
 
 
Political Stability  
 
 
PolS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as 
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional 
and violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism”. 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
 
Voice & 
Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free 
media” 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies”. 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
 
Regulation 
Quality 
 
RQ 
“Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development”. 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
 
Corruption-
Control 
 
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
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corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests” 
    
 
 
Rule of Law  
 
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Mobile phones  Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
GDP growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Population 
growth  
Popg Population growth rate (annual %) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Foreign 
investment  
FDI Foreign Direct Investment inflows (% of GDP) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Foreign aid    Aid Total Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Private Credit  Credit Private credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.   
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2000-2012) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Cost of starting business 156.079 219.820 0.300 1540.2 445 
Contract enforcement 39.305 5.224 23.000 54.000 445 
Start-up procedure 9.856 3.005 3.000 18.000 445 
Ware house time 195.760 98.496 48.000 599 367 
Time to enforce a contract 683.024 277.839 230.000 1715 445 
Time to register a property 82.592 74.197 9.000 389 412 
Time to start a business 49.884 43.658 5.000 260 445 
Time to export 33.789 14.344 10 78 375 
Time to pay taxes  319.382 196.048 66 1120 375 
Resolving an insolvency 3.094 1.129 1.7 6.2 372 
Mobile phone penetration  23.379 28.004 0.000 147.202 572 
Political Stability -0.543 0.956 -3.323 1.192 578 
Voice & Accountability -0.646 0.737 -2.233 0.990 578 
Government Effectiveness -0.771 0.620 -2.450 0.934 577 
Regulation Quality -0.715 0.644 -2.665 0.983 578 
Corruption-Control -0.642 0.591 -1.924 1.249 579 
Rule of Law -0.741 0.662 -2.668 1.056 578 
GDP growth  4.714 6.322 -47.552 63.379 608 
Population growth  2.361 0.948 -1.081 6.576 588 
Foreign Direct Investment inflows 5.332 8.737 -6.043 91.007 603 
Foreign aid   11.687 14.193 -0.253 181.187 606 
Private Domestic Credit 18.551 22.472 0.550 149.78 507 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
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Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 247) 
                       
Cost- 
ostart 
Contra- 
ctenf 
Startup- 
proced 
Timewa 
rehouse 
Timen 
forcontr 
Time 
regprop 
Time 
startbus 
Time 
xport 
Time 
taxes 
Timere 
sinsolv 
PolS VA GE RQ CC RL GDPg Popg FDI Aid Credit Mobile  
1.000 0.218 0.220 0.092 -0.068 0.263 0.028 0.317 0.157 0.214 -0.258 -0.274 -0.473 -0.424 -0.416 -0.395 0.067 0.353 -0.044 0.263 -0.309 -0.396 Costostart 
 1.000 0.134 -0.005 0.041 0.088 0.043 0.238 0.288 0.264 -0.520 -0.430 -0.555 -0.630 -0.597 -0.559 0.005 0.197 0.146 0.119 -0.407 -0.330 Contractenf 
  1.000 0.013 -0.161 -0.056 0.359 0.255 0.048 0.086 -0.232 -0.266 -0.155 -0.152 -0.196 -0.215 0.071 0.057 -0.138 -0.117 -0.251 -0.255 Startupproced 
   1.000 0.133 0.286 0.121 0.010 -0.007 0.111 -0.081 -0.157 -0.180 -0.143 -0.197 -0.151 -0.169 -0.083 -0.078 -0.154 -0.249 -0.077 Timewarehouse 
    1.000 -0.136 0.278 -0.238 -0.104 0.208 0.157 -0.0009 -0.027 -0.120 0.031 -0.001 0.045 -0.131 0.317 0.325 -0.038 0.066 Timenforcontr 
     1.000 -0.045 -0.070 0.073 -0.004 -0.008 -0.056 -0.192 -0.082 -0.150 -0.076 -0.064 0.044 -0.146 0.023 -0.095 -0.246 Timeregprop 
      1.000 0.050 0.145 0.206 0.183 -0.043 -0.041 -0.136 0.017 -0.028 -0.035 -0.228 0.201 0.031 -0.074 0.035 Timestartbus 
       1.000 0.187 0.312 -0.378 -0.339 -0.413 -0.400 -0.382 -0.401 0.126 0.293 -0.097 -0.008 -0.339 -0.519 Timexport 
        1.000 0.195 -0.332 -0.275 -0.335 -0.247 -0.413 -0.403 -0.036 0.113 -0.039 -0.171 -0.154 -0.103 Timetaxes 
         1.000 -0.111 -0.142 -0.381 -0.326 -0.383 -0.369 -0.016 0.240 0.093 0.194 -0.241 -0.271 Timeresinsolv 
          1.000 0.692 0.678 0.635 0.727 0.795 -0.053 -0.289 0.033 -0.101 0.286 0.399 PolS 
           1.000 0.797 0.757 0.745 0.808 0.097 -0.143 0.013 0.017 0.524 0.324 VA 
            1.000 0.875 0.888 0.915 0.0001 -0.415 -0.148 -0.262 0.618 0.484 GE 
             1.000 0.811 0.859 -0.038 -0.239 -0.210 -0.299 0.607 0.426 RG 
              1.000 0.894 -0.022 -0.432 -0.116 -0.210 0.521 0.451 CC 
               1.000 0.011 -0.307 -0.089 -0.174 0.496 0.422 RL 
                1.000 0.244 0.189 0.300 -0.100 -0.152 GDPg 
                 1.000 0.139 0.479 -0.406 -0.450 Popg 
                  1.000 0.423 -0.102 0.022 FDI 
                   1.000 -0.172 -0.264 Aid 
                    1.000 0.464 Credit 
                     1.000 Mobile 
                       
Costostart: cost of business start-up procedure. Contractenf: Procedure to enforce a contract. Startupproced: Start-up procedures to register a business. Timewarehouse: Time required to build a warehouse. 
Timenforcontr : Time required to enforce a contract. Timeregroup: Time required to register a property. Timestartbus : Time required to start a business. Timexport: Time to export. Timetaxes: Time to prepare and pay 
taxes. Timeresinsolv : Time to resolve insolvency. PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law.  GDPg: 
GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment inflows. Aid: Foreign aid. Credit: Private domestic credit. Mobile: Mobile Phone penetration.  
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Appendix 4: Persistence outcome variables  
           
 Cost- 
ostart 
Contra- 
ctenf 
Startup- 
proced 
Timeware- 
house 
Timen- 
forcontr 
Time- 
regprop 
Time- 
startbus 
Time- 
xport 
Time- 
taxes 
Time- 
resinsolv 
           
Costostart (-1) 0.9284          
Contractenf (-1)  0.9970         
Startupproced (-1)   0.9400        
Timewarehouse (-1)    0.9640       
Timenforcontr  (-1)     0.9883      
Timeregprop (-1)      0.9187     
Timestartbus (-1)       0.9263    
Timexport (-1)        0.9767   
Timetaxes (-1)         0.9923  
Timeresinsolv (-1)          0.9997 
           
Costostart: cost of business start-up procedure. Costostart (-1): lagged cost of business start-up procedure. Contractenf: Procedure to enforce 
a contract. Startupproced: Start-up procedures to register a business. Timewarehouse: Time required to build a warehouse. Timenforcontr : 
Time required to enforce a contract. Timeregroup: Time required to register a property. Timestartbus : Time required to start a business. 
Timexport: Time to export. Timetaxes: Time to prepare and pay taxes. Timeresinsolv : Time to resolve insolvency. 
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